Corporate Control Mechanisms and Risk
Shareholders face risks to their wealth associated with agency problems that arise from both actions and inactions of corporate managers. Internal and external corporate control mechanisms can mitigate these risks. Increasingly, however, research reveals the complexities associated with constructing optimal control mechanisms when contracting is incomplete. The purpose of this conference is to bring together academic researchers at the frontier of corporate control mechanisms and risk, where risk is broadly defined as the potential for economic loss or an undesirable outcome. The conference program includes both theoretical and empirical perspectives on the consequences of corporate control mechanisms on the risk to claimants as well as how pecuniary and non-pecuniary risks to delegated monitors or other agents influence the efficacy of control mechanisms.
Chip Ryan (Georgia State University) and Jarrad Harford (University of Washington) are the organizers of this symposium. Funding is provided by the Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk and the Department of Finance, both located in the J. Mack Robinson College of Business at Georgia State University.